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The formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Belgrade Conference in September 
1961, and the reactions in Washington, London, and Paris are topics that are remarkably 
under-researched. Much of what we know of the conference stems from work that was written 
in the late 1960s and 1970s. Political scientists in particular attempted to uncover what the 
Non-Aligned project wanted to achieve in geopolitical terms, what distinguished it from 
traditional neutralism, and how nonalignment transformed from the Bandung Conference of 
1955, through Belgrade in 1961, to the Cairo Conference of 1965.[1] Recently, historians have 
chosen to restore the role of race and the symbolism of the NAM in their analyses through 
discourse-centered work that presents Belgrade as a key moment when international relations 
became overlaid with racial meaning.[2] 
Robert Rakove connects to more recent work by comparing the American and British 
response to the Belgrade meeting and reaches some surprising conclusions. He argues that the 
American response to Belgrade suffered from bureaucratic factionalism. By building on the 
insights from his excellent book, Kennedy, Johnson and the Nonaligned World, Rakove 
maintains that the State Department was pessimistic about the Belgrade Conference while the 
White House staff, particularly National Security Council staffer Robert W. Komer, emerged 
as a critic of a hands-off policy.[3] Komer wanted to encourage moderate countries to attend. 
Only at the very last moment were liberals within the administration such as Chester Bowles 
and Adlai Stevenson able to change the official American response to Belgrade, when they 
convinced Kennedy to send a message with well wishes. 
The complex British foreign policy structure – with the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office, and the Colonial Office – in contrast, responded in a more coherent fashion. 
In Rakove’s estimation, the Harold Macmillan government, “had none of the handicaps of a 
newly inaugurated president” (355). Since much of its policy on decolonization was already 
in place by 1961, and Macmillan  had delivered his pathbreaking ‘Wind of Change’ speech 
which acknowledged the power of African nationalism, officials at Whitehall thought more 
constructively about the conference. The author claims they immediately decided to 
encourage the attendance of more moderate states. In Rakove’s view, the long and sometimes 
messy history of British imperialism, in places such as Kenya and India, hardly shaped the 
British response. Moreover, he departs from the conventional image of a British foreign 
policy structure in which different offices tried to gain the upper hand. 
In short, Rakove’s article is a complex and thought provoking piece of writing that raises 
important questions. Should we understand the Anglo-American response to the first meeting 
of the NAM as a “lost opportunity,” considering the fact that the agenda and the closing 
communiqué of the meeting remained vague? (355). When the delegates of nineteen 
nonaligned countries gathered to determine how they could politically harness a shared anti-
colonial sentiment, internal divisions among the participants bubbled to the surface. As 
Rakove writes, a moderate Asian group that wanted to include European neutrals confronted 
the more militant African Casablanca group, consisting of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. At the 
same time another, often overlooked, split emerged. Realists, particularly those in the 
Algerian delegation, saw the NAM as a lever to acquire financial and technical aid from the 
Cold War powers.[4] Leaders such as Sudan’s Ibrahim Abboud and Ghana’s Kwame 
Nkrumah, alternatively, wanted to construct an “ideal international society” geared towards 
world peace, an argument that emerges from the speeches they gave at Belgrade.[5] For the 
latter group, I would argue, the NAM was a means to prevent Cold War intrusion and a way 
to give substance to anti-colonial internationalism. In other words, were NAM leaders still 
interested in making the international system more equal, or did they want to get more out of 
the existing structure in terms of political influence and economic aid? Those questions were 
debated but remained ultimately unanswered. Belgrade not only institutionalized anti-colonial 
internationalism, but also made it more complex, making it more difficult for Western 
observers to understand what they faced. The published proceedings of the NAM meeting did 
not give a clear picture of the project, let alone create an opportunity for the West to come to 
terms with this new phenomenon. 
Furthermore, Belgrade can only be considered a missed opportunity if Western actors were 
able to conceive of nonaligned leaders as independent actors on the international stage with 
serious grievances. Rakove’s analysis suggests the opposite: “It was difficult in the late 
summer of 1961 to view the Belgrade Conference in its own right” (357). In the eyes of 
American diplomats, Belgrade participants were potential proxies in the Cold War game. The 
White House initiated its own campaign to promote a positive attitude among confirmed 
attendees of the meeting only after the Berlin crisis reached its peak in July 1961. Concerns 
about the possibility that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev might convince the Non-Aligned 
Movement to support his peace plan for Berlin ultimately compelled the Kennedy 
administration to act. Furthermore, American policymakers found it difficult to take the 
grievances of the Non-Aligned nations seriously. George Kennan, the U.S. Ambassador to 
Yugoslavia, did not simply channel his own “anger” over the “rambling” of delegates in his 
diplomatic cables, as Rakove writes (351-352). The fact that Kennan was able to substantially 
shape the assessment of Belgrade in Washington indicates that he tapped into a sentiment 
within American policy circles about the perceived emotionalism and irrationality of the 
conference participants. 
The British, in their turn, were also unable to understand the position anti-colonial leaders 
were taking. Rakove credits the Macmillan government for a more coherent policy and argues 
that the British better understood “the gathering force of anti-colonial sentiment” (355). It is 
important, however, not to overstate his conclusion. The fact that the British ambassador to 
Belgrade, Michael Creswell, castigated as “‘misconceived’ the view that ‘the Conference was 
faced with a choice between East and West’” does not necessarily mean the United Kingdom 
had a better understanding of the events in Belgrade. Officials such as Creswell believed that 
the British were better placed to solve problems in the area of decolonization and therefore 
reflected that confidence in their diplomatic correspondence. The ‘Wind of Change’ speech 
has to be seen in a similar light. As Joanna Lewis has argued, the hastily decided on speech 
had to restore Britain’s liberal image in the world. Moreover, by acknowledging African 
nationalism, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan avoided the racial problems of South Africa 
and Rhodesia.[6] 
By meticulously reconstructing the bureaucratic decision making process in Whitehall and the 
White House, Rakove fills a major gap in the literature. At the same time, his narrative makes 
clear that policy makers in the Western world were thinking about strategies to manage the 
Non-Aligned Movement. His article offers historians a starting point to think about the wider 
significance of NAM in the international history of the twentieth century. The conference not 
only presented the world with anti-colonial leaders who worked to harness the Cold War to 
maximize potential benefits. I would argue that the meeting also forced diplomats and 
policymakers in the Global North to think about ways in which the other international reality 
of their age, decolonization, could be exploited. Washington and London wanted to 
understand and transform anti-colonial nationalism and nonaligned internationalism into 
something that was less threatening and more in line with their own plans for the postcolonial 
world. 
Rakove’s concise narrative, eye for detail, comparative focus, and exhaustive use of the 
sources will make the article a much cited contribution to the history of nonalignment and the 
Non-Aligned Movement. 
Frank Gerits completed his dissertation at the European University Institute in Florence, 
Italy, entitled, The Ideological Scramble for Africa: The US, Ghanaian, French and British 
Ideological Competition for Africa’s Future, 1953-1963. He will be a post-doctoral fellow at 
the Center for the United States and the Cold War, at New York University in the Spring of 
2015. 
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